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Has the Elite Foundation Agenda Spread
Beyond the Gates? An Organizational
Network Analysis of Nonmajor
Philanthropic Giving in K–12 Education
JOSEPH J. FERRARE
University of Kentucky
KATHERINE REYNOLDS
Boston College
Previous research focusing on major philanthropic foundations suggests that these
actors have collectively converged around a set of jurisdictional challengers promoting market-based education reforms. Using correspondence analysis, network
analysis, and geographic information science, this article empirically tests whether
this convergence has permeated to less prominent foundations and their grantees,
or if these foundations are pursuing alternative organizational strategies to shape
K–12 outcomes. The analysis draws from a sample of 15 nonmajor foundations
and their 1,069 grantees serving some aspect of K–12 education in 2010. We ﬁnd
that nonmajor foundations have adopted some elements of major foundations’
organizational strategies to inﬂuence K–12 education but that their strategies are
heterogeneous and reﬂect both challenges to—and opportunities for—a more
varied and democratic structure of policy making.

Elite (or major) foundations involved in education—those who wield disproportionate inﬂuence through their ﬁnancial and social capital—have received
substantial attention in research literature and popular media in the past decade. The heightened attention is, in part, driven by the amount of inﬂuence
these foundations (e.g., Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation) are perceived to
have over education policy. Yet, this is not explicitly about dollars and cents.
Although the amount of foundation dollars ﬂowing into the realm of K–12 education has been increasing, philanthropic funds still provide only a small sliver
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Nonmajor Philanthropic Giving in K–12 Education
of total spending in education when compared to state budgets. Instead, the inﬂuential power of foundations arises from their ability to create, sustain, and
transform networks of organizations that can collectively mobilize the resources
needed to shape education policy across local, national, and international scales
(Ball and Junemann 2012; Scott and Jabbar 2013).
Collective action among philanthropic foundations has an extensive history. Between 1920 and 1940, for instance, a coalition of major foundations
led a coordinated effort to bring structural changes to higher education. Consistent with the broader trend of social efﬁciency at the time, these foundations—
which included the Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations—worked to transform institutions of higher education through the implementation of a corporate model of governance (Barrow 1990). Today these types of coalitions remain actively involved in shaping all levels of education policy. For example, in
Washington State’s 2012 general election, a national network of philanthropists, corporate executives, and nonproﬁt organizations collectively worked to
narrowly pass a statewide charter-school initiative that had been rejected by
voters in three consecutive elections (Au and Ferrare 2014). In fact, research
suggests that major foundations are strategically converging on (i.e., cofunding)
a limited group of organizations across the United States—called jurisdictional
challengers—that offer alternative educational services (e.g., credentialing, school
management, teacher training) long controlled by traditional institutions such
as public school districts and colleges of education (Mehta and Teles 2012;
Reckhow 2010; Reckhow and Snyder 2014). Prominent jurisdictional challengers such as Teach For America, New Schools Venture Fund, and Knowledge Is Power Program have been direct beneﬁciaries of these networks and
have had a profound impact on the national conversation about school reform (Kretchmar et al. 2014; Scott and Jabbar 2014; Zeichner and PenaSandoval 2015).
The existing evidence makes it clear that elite foundations are collectively
acting through a network of jurisdictional challengers to shape speciﬁc education
policy outcomes, but it is not clear whether these same strategies extend to less
inﬂuential foundations. The primary objective of this study is to empirically test
whether less prominent (or nonmajor) foundations have converged on the same
types of grantees, or if these foundations’ giving patterns represent competing
organizational strategies of K–12 education policy and reform. To test our hypothesis we replicate and extend portions of the organizational network analysis
JOSEPH J. FERRARE is an assistant professor in the Department of Educational Policy Studies and Evaluation and the Department of Sociology at the
University of Kentucky. KATHERINE REYNOLDS is a doctoral student in the
Department of Educational Research, Measurement, and Evaluation at Boston
College.
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Ferrare and Reynolds
design used by Reckhow and Snyder (2014). Whereas their study examined the
top 15 giving foundations in K–12 education, we focus on 15 foundations that
were substantially less prominent but still engaged in similar domains of education policy in 2010. Thus, unlike Reckhow and Snyder’s longitudinal analysis,
here we focus solely on giving patterns at one point in time (in 2010). Yet, with the
insights from their ﬁndings, we are able to assess whether the giving patterns
among major foundations in 2010 had permeated into less prominent positions
within the philanthropic ﬁeld and to consider the implications these forms of
giving have on recipient organizations and the broader realm of education policy
in which they are situated.
In addition to our network analytic approach, we use basic techniques from
geographic information science (GIS) and cartography to examine the distribution of these foundations’ funding and network patterns. The geographic dimensions to these practices are important to investigate so we can determine
whether nonmajor foundations are engaged in national efforts or are primarily
seeking to build local networks of organizations to shape education. Further,
these illustrative techniques allow us to assess whether substantial interstate gaps
exist in philanthropic funding ﬂows that may leave some states and their resident nonproﬁt educational organizations without access to the vital funds provided by philanthropic foundations. In this sense, our analysis opens the door to
understanding forms of geographic stratiﬁcation that emerge through philanthropic involvement in education.
At a more general level, our work contributes to a long tradition of scholarship that has raised important questions from a wide range of perspectives
concerning the role of private wealth in shaping the direction of public education and social policy in the United States (e.g., Arnove 1982; Faber and
McCarthy 2005; Lagemann 1983; Reckhow 2013; Saltman 2010). In fact, the
use of network analysis has been a crucial tool in this tradition, dating back to
at least the mid-1970s and including Mary Anna Culleton Colwell’s (1980)
“The Foundation Connection: Links Among Foundations and Recipient Organizations.” Colwell’s rich empirical account found a tightly connected foundation “club” linked directly to the policy-making process. As a result, Colwell
called into question whether these networks of foundations and nonproﬁts actually constitute a viable alternative to businesses and government bodies working to advance education and social policy.
Nearly all of the work in this tradition has focused on foundations whose
endowments were derived from prominent wealthy elites—such as Carnegie,
Rockefeller, and Gates—who captured public attention with their success in
the private sector. In recent years this conversation has gained momentum with
the proliferation of venture philanthropic practices and the availability of data
to analyze these patterns. Yet, missing from this discussion is the role of less
prominent foundations whose ﬁnancial contributions to education are smaller
NOVEMBER 2016
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Nonmajor Philanthropic Giving in K–12 Education
than those of their elite counterparts but in the aggregate constitute a sizeable
portion of the total funds given to organizations that serve public education.
Gaining a deeper understanding of nonmajor foundations’ organizational strategies vis-à-vis elite philanthropic actors extends our understanding of how foundations shape education and informs the debate over whether and how private
power can be used to service the public good. Thus, while our primary objective
is to test the hypothesis described above, we also intend for this work to contribute to the broader conversation concerning the role of philanthropic involvement in shaping education policy in a democratic society.

Philanthropic Foundations and Education Policy Networks
The scholarly literature focusing on philanthropic involvement in education
policy has been quite proliﬁc in recent years. Although the active role of philanthropists in education is certainly not a new phenomenon, some have argued
that the strategy of venture (or “strategic”) philanthropy has become a dominant practice within the philanthropic ﬁeld (Reckhow 2013; Scott 2009).
Venture philanthropy is an approach to philanthropic giving that closely follows the principles of venture capital investment. Similar to venture capitalists, venture philanthropists seek to maximize returns on investments (e.g., as
measured by achievement growth or graduation rates), expand educational
markets, and fund advocacy organizations that promote a market-oriented
policy agenda (Cohen 2007; Lipman 2011; Scott 2009). Venture philanthropy
represents a departure from the strategies of traditional philanthropists (e.g.,
Carnegie, Rockefeller) who, in addition to sheltering their endowments from
taxes, framed their efforts in terms of the public good and widening access to
public institutions (Scott 2009).
Venture philanthropic practices have accelerated the construction and complexity of policy networks in the realm of education. At the most general level,
policy networks are self-organizing sets of interconnected actors (organizations,
individuals, agencies, etc.) who exchange a variety of resources to achieve desired policy outcomes (Davies 2005). In this sense, policy networks operate as
a form of “government without governing” (Rhodes 1996, 2006). Such networks
have come to play an inﬂuential role in multiple policy-making realms as social
democratic contracts have eroded in the context of advanced deregulation,
trade liberalization, and other neoliberal reforms (Harvey 2005; Jones 2012).
Policy networks have become an important form of governance among reformers working to advance market-based policies in education (Au and Ferrare
2015; Ball and Junemann 2012). Bureaucratic bodies such as the US Department of Education, for example, are using policy networks to mobilize juris-
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dictional challengers to push policy initiatives at state and local levels (Mehta and
Teles 2012). Similarly, and often in concert with federal and state actors, major
philanthropic foundations have found policy networks to be an efﬁcient means of
inﬂuencing education policy and reform movements. Scholars have argued that
philanthropists and their foundations serve as central nodes in these networks
that channel resources to a wide variety of think tanks, media, school reform
organizations, charter management organizations, and advocacy groups (Scott
and Jabbar 2014). At the same time, the informal nature of policy networks
allows foundations to maintain a cautious and incremental stance toward their
(potentially risky) engagement in the policy realm (Ferris et al. 2008).
The existing literature on philanthropic foundations and education policy
networks suggests that these networks have converged on a policy agenda that
emphasizes market-based interventions (Ball and Junemann 2012; Reckhow
and Snyder 2014; Saltman 2010; Scott 2009) through discourses of entrepreneurship, innovation, and enterprise (Anderson and Donchik 2014; Ball and
Exley 2010; Bell 2015; see also McShane and Hess 2015). A network analysis
conducted by Kretchmar et al. (2014), for example, found that major foundations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Eli and Edythe Broad
Foundation, Walton Foundation, and Fisher Foundation were the primary ﬁnanciers of policy networks working to shape K–12 reform through the proliferation of charter schools, charter management organizations, and alternative teacher and leadership certiﬁcation. Similar networks have been observed
in the United Kingdom (Hogan et al. 2015; Olmedo 2014; Santori et al. 2015),
China (Liu 2015), and Chile (Campos-Martinez et al. 2015), suggesting a certain degree of similarity in education policy networks across national contexts
(Ball 2012; Rizvi and Lingard 2010).
Although the previously cited studies provide signiﬁcant support for the
thesis that major philanthropic foundations—and the policy networks in which
they are embedded—share a relatively homogenous policy agenda, they do not
demonstrate the extent to which this policy convergence has taken shape over
time. The most compelling evidence for the latter can be found in the work of
Reckhow and Snyder (2014; see also Reckhow 2013). In their longitudinal study,
Reckhow and Snyder demonstrate that since 2000 the top 15 philanthropic
foundations in education have dramatically increased the amount of money
they have given to national advocacy and research organizations while simultaneously converging on a select set of jurisdictional challengers. For example,
between 2000 and 2010 these major foundations doubled the amount of money
donated to national advocacy and research organizations from $56.3 million
to $110.6 million. In addition, in 2000 the top 15 foundations primarily gave
their money to traditional institutions such as public schools, state departments
of education, and universities, but in 2010 their giving patterns shifted dra-
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matically toward jurisdictional challengers including charter schools, alternative teacher training, and venture capital (Reckhow and Snyder 2014).
Another striking ﬁnding from Reckhow and Snyder’s study is the extent to
which this policy shift has coincided with organizational convergence (i.e., multiple foundations funding the same grantees). In 2000, not a single pair of grantees received at least $2 million from three or more of the top 15 education
funders. That number climbed to 10 in 2005 and ballooned to more than 40
by 2010 (Reckhow and Snyder 2014). At the center of this afﬁliation network in
2010 are the same organizations that have been prominently observed in the
recent case studies noted above, such as Teach For America (TFA), Knowledge
Is Power Program (KIPP), and New Schools Venture Fund (Kretchmar et al.
2014; Zeichner and Pena-Sandoval 2015).
When taken together, the evidence is clear that elite philanthropic foundations
have come to prefer awarding jurisdictional challengers and other organizations
that promote the deregulation of teaching and the adoption of charter schools
and strict accountability measures. Key questions remain, however: To what
extent have these organizational funding strategies permeated into the philanthropic ﬁeld outside of widely recognized major foundations? Are less prominent philanthropic foundations giving to the same types of organizations as major foundations, or are their giving patterns reﬂective of alternative organizational
strategies for shaping education policy and reform? We address these questions
directly in our analysis. Before we do, however, we ground our analysis in a theoretical perspective that anticipates both strategic conformity and divergence in
the philanthropic ﬁeld.

Modeling Philanthropic Involvement in Education Policy Networks
A compelling way to explain the dynamics shaping philanthropic involvement
in education policy is through the concept of institutional isomorphism as developed by new institutional theorists in organizational studies (e.g., DiMaggio
and Powell 1983). The central premise of new institutional theory is that, in the
face of uncertainty, organizations tend toward similarity through three processes of isomorphism: coercive, mimetic, and normative. For instance, a philanthropic organization looking to award grants in education may follow the
giving patterns of an established and respected organization such as the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation (mimetic isomorphism). Alternatively, a foundation
may follow certain patterns because of pressure from other organizations or
from cultural expectations circulating through a given domain (coercive isomorphism). In the second instance, a foundation situated in a locality with a
strong teachers’ union may face pressure to maintain funding to a local public
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school district rather than a competing charter management organization. Finally, a philanthropic organization may implicitly follow funding patterns because it tends to hire senior staff that has recognizable experiences or afﬁliations
with other foundation executives (normative isomorphism).
Institutional theory has proved to be a productive line of research in organizational studies in general and in the realm of education in particular (Meyer
1977; Meyer and Rowan 1978). However, although institutional theory has been
successful at explaining conformity in educational organizations, it has not been
able to adequately explain the emergence and transformation of organizational
ﬁelds and the extent to which even stable ﬁelds are shaped by power relations
(Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 2012). In light of these shortcomings, the organizational strand of ﬁeld theory (Emirbayer and Johnson 2008; Fligstein and
McAdam 2011, 2012; Mohr 2013) is better equipped to assist analysts in understanding the contentious and dynamic nature of philanthropic giving in the
realm of education policy.
Organizational ﬁeld theory shares much in common with institutional theory in the assumption that “strategic action ﬁelds are the fundamental units of
collective action in society” (Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 3). Whereas institutional theory emphasizes stability and conformity among actors in organizational ﬁelds, organizational ﬁeld theory understands these ﬁelds as relatively
autonomous domains of action constituted by positions of incumbents and
challengers (and sometimes governance units; Fligstein and McAdam 2011,
2012).1 Incumbents are those organizations that wield disproportionate inﬂuence in the ﬁeld. A clear example in the present context is the Bill and Melinda
Gates Foundation, as it donates the largest sums of money, captures extensive
media attention, and is routinely invited to weigh in on education policy issues
with elected ofﬁcials and other policy elites. Challengers, meanwhile, are those
who occupy less prominent positions vis-à-vis incumbent actors and thus typically exert little inﬂuence over the direction of the ﬁeld. Nevertheless, challengers may advance alternative visions while conforming to dominant strategies. For example, in 2010 the Claude Worthington Benedum Foundation
donated to jurisdictional challengers such as charter schools, but it gave its
largest sums of money to state departments of education2—which were then
marginal recipients among incumbent actors (see Reckhow and Snyder 2014).
Thus, even during times of relative stability and apparent homogeneity, organizational ﬁeld theory assumes that there are always competing visions of
education within the philanthropic ﬁeld.
Organizational ﬁeld theory’s emphasis on differential power relations means
that it is also well equipped to explain change. For example, education policy
analysts often cite the perceived failure of the Annenberg Challenge as a turning
point in the philanthropic ﬁeld (Colvin 2005; Reckhow 2010) that effectively
created space for organizations such as the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to
NOVEMBER 2016
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try new forms of strategic action (e.g., venture philanthropic strategies). Yet it was
not simply the widespread perception of failure that led to change but also the
social skill (Fligstein 2001) possessed by then challengers such as Gates to read the
situation and engage other organizations toward collective action. In addition,
such dramatic changes to strategic action ﬁelds are only possible if alternative
visions are present within the ﬁeld during times of apparent stability. In this way,
ﬁeld theory anticipates that change is always a possibility given the right conditions.
Organizational ﬁeld theory is used in the present context to position a sample
of less prominent organizations as challengers within the strategic action ﬁeld of
philanthropic organizations in K–12 policy. We test whether these challengers
are conforming to the market-based funding strategies of incumbent actors (i.e.,
major foundations) or pursuing alternative organizational strategies to inﬂuence
K–12 education. Our theoretical approach generates a number of hypotheses.
First, we anticipate that in 2010 our sample of challengers primarily exhibited
funding patterns that diverged from those of their incumbent counterparts. Second, we hypothesize that our sample of challengers did not act as a homogeneous group but instead was comprised of factions as reﬂected in their patterns
of giving to K–12 education. That is, we expect some challengers to have behaved more like incumbents and others to have followed patterns of giving that
reﬂect alternative visions of education policy. Further, we hypothesize that these
expected behaviors hinge, in part, on the geographic scale and proximity in
which challengers act in the philanthropic ﬁeld vis-à-vis other foundations engaged in similar activities. Intuitively, our theoretical perspective expects that
nonmajor foundation dollars ﬂowed at primarily local scales where these organizations believed they could have the greatest impact. Yet, the convergence
of grant funding—multiple foundations donating funds to the same organizations—primarily hinged on the proximity of other foundations. Each of these
hypotheses has important implications for the broader role that foundations play
in shaping K–12 education policy.

Sampling, Data, and Method
The sampling strategy in this study was to identify foundations outside of the
top 15 in 2010 (in dollars given) that had similar giving proﬁles to the top 15
foundations across a range of K–12 policy domains. The primary reason we
chose to focus on 2010 was so that we could make a direct comparison between
our sample and the sample of top 15 foundations used by Reckhow and Snyder
(2014). Although more recent foundation data are available, we cannot assume that the giving patterns of the top 15 foundations remained the same.
144

American Journal of Education

This content downloaded from 128.163.008.074 on December 05, 2017 08:28:53 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).

Ferrare and Reynolds
This direct comparison allows us to assess the similarities and differences between incumbent and challenger foundations as they occurred in 2010.
The ﬁrst step in our sampling procedure was to draw from the Foundation
Center’s 2010 Top 50 Foundation Funding lists3 for 11 domains of elementary and secondary education policy: accountability, arts education, college
and career preparation, early learning, standards, literacy and reading skills,
low-performing schools, out-of-school and summer, rural education, STEM,
and teacher quality and leadership. These lists produced a total of 230 philanthropic foundations. A foundation-by-policy domain matrix was then created in which each cell illustrates the percentage of total dollars that foundation i awarded to policy domain j. The next step was to identify 15 of the
230 foundations whose award patterns across the 11 policy domains were most
similar to those of the top 15 foundations identiﬁed by Reckhow and Snyder
(2014). To select the subset of foundations in a nonarbitrary way, we used correspondence analysis (CA) to position and subsequently select the foundations
relative to the top 15 foundations’ patterns of K–12 giving. As a data reduction
technique, the goal of CA is to represent dissimilarities between objects (in this
case, organizations and policy domains) in a contingency table as Euclidean
distances in a multidimensional space (Greenacre and Blasius 2006).
The CA ( principle coordinates method) resulted in 10 dimensions that together accounted for 100% of the variation in the original matrix. The 10 dimensional coordinates for each foundation were then sorted in descending
order by the factors explaining the greatest amount of variance. Each of the
top 15 foundations was then located in the list, and the foundation outside the
top 15 with the closest coordinates was selected for inclusion in the sample. In
some cases the closest foundation was another top 15 organization, and these
foundations were treated as a cluster and the nearest foundation was chosen
based on the closest distance to the cluster of top 15 foundations. The result was
a sample of 15 foundations that had the most similar giving proﬁles to the top 15
foundations in 2010 across the 11 policy domains.
As shown in table 1, the foundations in our sample are primarily engaged in
funding education, arts and culture, and a variety of issues dealing with community vitality. The average market value of the foundations in our sample was
slightly more than $596 million in 2010, with a minimum of $49.9 million (Ford
Motor Company Fund) and a maximum of $1.9 billion (Kauffman Foundation).
Most of the foundations derived their assets from the wealth of business moguls.
Many of these foundations were started and led by widows, such as Minnie K.
Grable (wife of Errett, founder of Rubbermaid) and Grace A. Dow (wife of
Herbert, founder of Dow Chemical). These foundations typically (though not
exclusively) focus on funding local and regional programs in Pennsylvania and
Michigan, respectively. Many other foundations, such as Bradley and Kauffman,
are focused on local, state, and national scales, particularly through programs
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TABLE

1

Sampled Foundations as Derived by Correspondence Analysis of Giving Proﬁles across 11 Policy
Domains in K–12 Education
Sampled Foundation (Closest
Top 15 in 2010a)

Area of Emphasis

1. The Grable Foundation (Gates) Early childhood, school systems,
out-of-school time, community
vitality
2. The Herbert H. and Grace
Education, science, arts and culDow Foundation (Walton,
ture, community vitality
Carnegie)
3. Barr Foundation (Kellogg)
Arts and culture, education, climate, global
4. Druckenmiller Foundation
Education, poverty
(Dell)
5. Open Society Institute (Silicon Education and youth, governance
Valley)
and accountability, health,
media and information, rights
and justice
6. The Lynde and Harry Bradley Democratic capitalism, limited
Foundation, Inc. (Robertson,
government, defending AmeriComm. Fnd. of Texas)
can ideas, supporting markets,
enlightened citizenry
7. Ford Motor Company Fund Community vitality, education,
(Carnegie)
driving safety
8. Altman Foundation (Hewlett) Education, health, community
vitality, arts and culture,
nonproﬁts
9. The Noyce Foundation (Broad) Teaching math and literacy,
school leadership, science education, education policy
10. Ewing Marion Kauffman
Education, entrepreneurship,
Foundation (GE)
Kansas City
11. Claude Worthington
Education, economic developBenedum Foundation ( James
ment, health and human
Irvine)
services, community vitality
12. W. M. Keck Foundation
Research, undergraduate educa(Fisher)
tion, southern California
13. Deutsche Bank Americas
Community vitality, education,
Foundation (Comm. Fnd.
arts and culture
of Texas)
14. The Charles Hayden FounEducation, children and youth
dation (Daniels)
15. The Ralph M. Parsons
Social impact, health, higher edFoundation (Ford)
ucation, civic and cultural development

2010 Market
Value ($)
257,236,911
434,609,837
1,134,513,133
864,200,491
1,141,004,097

561,556,697

49,885,020
246,129,529
143,727,641
1,892,243,801
366,704,435
1,167,429,096
23,007,901
281,953,712
388,666,935

NOTE.—In 2 instances a selected foundation had coordinates positioned between 2
of the top 15 foundations. In these instances, we listed both of the top 15 foundations.
a
The top 15 counterparts were taken from Reckhow and Snyder (2014).
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that promote free enterprise and limited government. The Open Society Institute, on the other hand, founded by the hedge-fund manager George Soros, is
active in more than 70 countries around the world.
Following the sample construction, we entered all K–12 education-related
grants for each of the 15 nonmajor foundations into a database. Grant information for the foundations was gathered from 2010 Form 990s as provided by
the Foundation Center’s 990 Finder.4 Building from Reckhow and Snyder’s
thematic scheme (see 2014, app. B, 195), each recipient organization was then
coded based on the type of organization (e.g., national advocacy, public school,
state department of education). In the data set, then, each foundation has as
many row entries as grants given, where the row indicates the recipient organization, state of residency, organization type, and amount of the award. In the
aggregate, our sample of foundations awarded 1,549 grants and $162.5 million
(inﬂation adjusted) to 1,069 organizations serving some aspect of K–12 education across the United States. In comparison, their top 15 counterparts awarded
2,600 grants totaling more than $843 million (Reckhow and Snyder 2014).

Afﬁliation Network Analysis and GIS
We use a combination of three analytic strategies to test our research questions:
descriptive statistics, afﬁliation network analysis, and geographic information
science (GIS). Unlike traditional network graphs, which depict direct connections between actors, an afﬁliation network graph depicts relations between
qualitatively different sets of actors or events ( Wasserman and Faust 1994). In
the present case, we examine a set of foundations and their giving patterns to a
set of recipient organizations. In doing so, we are able to explore the full duality
of these sets of organizational actors (Breiger 1974; Mohr and Guerra-Pearson
2010). That is, afﬁliation graphs allow us to examine the degree of (dis)similarity between foundations by virtue of the types of organizations they cofund
as we investigate the types of organizations that become afﬁliated through the
funders they share in common.
We also use directed afﬁliation network graphs to assess the degree of convergence among our sample of foundations. Reckhow and Snyder (2014) used
a similar approach to measure convergence in multiple ways. The authors began by identifying the percentage of awards that were convergent grants; that
is, the total dollars given to organizations that received awards from two or
more foundations (see also Reckhow 2010). Reckhow and Snyder then raised
the threshold of convergence by analyzing afﬁliation graphs consisting of pairs
of organizations that received grants from three or more of the same foundations with a minimum of $2 million in total awards.
NOVEMBER 2016
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Our approach begins in a similar fashion by identifying the proportion of
convergent grants among our sample of foundations. From here, though, we
depart from the approach used by Reckhow and Snyder (2014) in a few important ways. First, we use two-mode afﬁliation graphs rather than the one-mode
(i.e., organization-by-organization) graphs used in Reckhow and Snyder’s study.
Although appropriate to the authors’ research questions, the one-mode approach
removes an entire set of actors (the foundations) from the data space, which means
the graph is not able to identify potential variations in giving patterns among
the foundations sampled. Our approach, in contrast, models the full duality of
foundations and recipient organizations. In doing so we are able to examine
the exact foundations that are converging on speciﬁc recipient organizations
and to identify unique factions of giving within the network. Second, given
that, by deﬁnition, our sampled foundations awarded substantially less money
than those in the top 15, we decided the $2 million threshold would exclude
meaningful patterns of convergence in our sample. Thus, we examine convergence from the more general deﬁnition used by Reckhow and Snyder (2014)
instead.
Finally, we use principles of GIS and cartography in combination with our
network analysis to map the geographic patterns of overall funding and convergent giving among our sampled foundations. In particular, we use a choropleth
map to show the distribution of funds by state and a ﬂow map to overlay our
afﬁliation convergence graph over the geographic space of the United States. A
choropleth map uses shading to highlight geographic areas in relation to a variable—in this case, total funds awarded at the state level. A ﬂow map simply shows
the direction of ﬂow of some variable over geographic space. These visualizations
illustrate the foundations that are donating and converging in national scales
versus those whose efforts remain on state or local scales. By recognizing that
networks occupy social and geographic space, we can better assess the implications of nonmajor philanthropic involvement in K–12 education policy.

Results
Nonmajor Foundations and Advocacy
As federal and state roles in education policy have expanded in the past 2 decades, major philanthropic foundations have also shifted their focus away
from local advocacy organizations toward national organizations that engage
in lobbying, research, and other forms of advocacy. In fact, 13.1% of the total
dollars awarded by the top 15 foundations in 2010 were given to national advocacy organizations (Reckhow and Snyder 2014). However, at smaller scales,
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a similar emphasis on national over local advocacy can be seen among the nonmajor foundations in the present sample. For instance, national advocacy and
research organizations focused on K–12 education received 9.5% of the total
dollars given by our sample of 15 challenger foundations in 2010. The top three
funded national advocacy organizations were the Hudson Institute, Manhattan
Institute for Policy Research, and the American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research. The amounts for state and local advocacy organizations, on the
other hand, were considerably lower, at 4.4% and 2.2%, respectively. Thus, although these nonmajor donors in education awarded a somewhat smaller proportion of their grants to national advocacy than did the top 15 foundations,
both followed a similar general pattern favoring national over local advocacy.
Although it is clear that the 15 challenger foundations all emphasized national advocacy and research at state and local scales, it would be a mistake to
assume that these 15 challenger foundations acted in unison. Figures 1 and 2
illustrate the differentiated structure of advocacy giving at the scalar and organizational levels, respectively. It can be seen, for example, that Parsons
focused exclusively on the national level of advocacy and research but that
Keck and Benedum gave to state and regional organizations (see ﬁg. 1). Others
focused on two scales. For instance, Noyce and Druckenmiller gave to national
and to state and regional organizations, Dow gave to state and regional and
local organizations, and Hayden and Deutsche Bank gave to national and local
organizations. The organizations positioned toward the center of the graph—
Bradley, Ford Motor Company Fund, Altman, Kauffman, and Barr—spread
their awards across all scales (though not necessarily in equal amounts).
Figure 2 illustrates that the organizational structure of these patterns is sparse
and varied, with most foundations focusing on their own unique sets of advocacy
organizations. Several foundations, it turns out, awarded few grants to advocacy
organizations. Keck and Parsons each awarded grants to only one advocacy and
research organization, and an additional six foundations awarded grants to between two and ﬁve of these organizations. The story is different for the remaining
seven foundations, however. Barr gave at all scales but focused its awards on a
mutually exclusive set of organizations. The Open Society, Ford Motor Company Fund, and Noyce and Altman Foundations followed a similar pattern, but
they are linked to a larger structure via individual bridge organizations such as
the Afterschool Alliance, Lulac National Educational Service Centers, and the
Aspen Institute. Kauffman and Bradley emerged as unique in this graph for their
convergent funding to ﬁve conservative think tanks, the National Council on
Teacher Quality, and the RAND Corporation. This structural and substantive
variation in giving suggests that, in terms of advocacy grants, some challenger
foundations behaved more like incumbent, or major, foundations, and others
used contrasting strategies to develop and promote their educational policy
agendas.
NOVEMBER 2016
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FIG. 1.—Directed afﬁliation graph of scalar funding patterns to nonproﬁt advocacy and research organizations. A thicker line represents a higher frequency of grant awards.
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FIG. 2.—Directed afﬁliation graph of organizational funding patterns to nonproﬁt advocacy and research organizations. Only foundations and cofunded organizations are labeled.
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Traditional Actors versus Jurisdictional Challengers
In addition to advocacy and research, the funding of jurisdictional challengers has
become a dominant policy network strategy among incumbent foundations to
facilitate market-oriented reforms (Mehta and Teles 2012; Reckhow and Snyder
2014). Table 2 provides mixed evidence for this strategy among the present
sample of nonmajor foundations. Following Reckhow and Snyder (2014; see
ﬁg. 1), we consider public schools and districts, universities, and state departments of education as traditional institutions, and charter schools and networks,
teacher training and recruitment, and venture capital ﬁrms as jurisdictional
challengers. We also added school leadership training as a category under jurisdictional challengers.
As illustrated in table 2, charter schools and organizations (e.g., charter
school networks) received 5.7% of the total foundation awards in 2010, which is
more than twice the amount given to public schools (2.2%) and four times the
amount given to universities (1.4%). Training and recruitment organizations
for teachers (2.6%) and school leaders (2.3%) and venture capital organizations
(3.0%) also received small but nontrivial portions of total grants. In fact, three
of the top ﬁve funded organizations in the sample—Harlem Children Zone,
Charter Growth Fund, and New Leaders for New Schools—are jurisdictional

TABLE

2

Percentage of Total Grants and Funding Given to Traditional Institutions, Jurisdictional Challengers,
and Top 5 Organization Types Overall (by Funding)

Traditional institutions:
Public schools and orgs
Universities
State departments of education
Jurisdictional challengers:
Charter schools and orgs
Venture capital
Teacher training and recruitment
Leadership training and recruitment
Top 5 organization types (by funding):
College access and scholarships
National advocacy and research
Arts education
Afterschool, tutoring, mentoring
Other student enrichment

% of Grants

% of Funding

5.1
.7
.5

2.2
1.4
.8

4.4
.5
1.0
.6

5.7
3.0
2.6
2.3

2.8
10.7
12.2
9.5
11.3

17.6
9.5
8.8
8.2
7.2

SOURCE.—Authors’ own data compiled from foundations’ Forms 990.
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challengers, with the other two being a private school (Spence School) and scholarship fund (Kauffman Scholars) that partners with Kaplan K12 Services and
Tutor.com to provide academic support. Even though traditional education institutions received a meaningful percentage of foundation dollars from this sample, none of these institutions received as much as any category of or individual
organization within the jurisdictional challengers.
Figure 3 illustrates that, yet again, important variations exist among our
sample of challenger foundations. Starting at the left side of the graph, we can
see that Druckenmiller and Noyce gave almost exclusively to jurisdictional challengers, with the exception being Noyce’s awards to universities. In contrast,
Dow and Deutsche Bank gave exclusively to traditional institutions falling under
the categories of public schools and universities. Positioned in between are those
foundations that spread their awards across jurisdictional challengers and traditional institutions, although as indicated by the line weights, some (e.g., Bradley
and Hayden) clearly placed substantial emphasis on the former over the latter in
the number of grants awarded. The most striking feature of the graph, though,
is the positioning of public schools and charter schools. The central position—
and close proximity—of these organizations stems from the fact that 11 of the
15 foundations gave to both types of organizations. That these ostensibly competing organizational forms hang together in the network suggests that, in terms
of awards received from nonmajor foundations, they are quite similar. Yet, as
we saw in table 2, the amount of money given to charter schools is more than
twice that given to public schools. Thus, although our sample of foundations
gave more total grants to public schools (79) than to charter schools (68), the
average size of the grants to charter school and network grants was about three
times that of the mean grant given to public schools and districts.
Examining the organizational structure of giving to jurisdictional challengers
versus that of traditional institutions (see ﬁgs. 4 and 5) sheds additional light on
how nonmajor foundations pursue their educational objectives. Figure 4 illustrates that many challenger foundations funded their own networks of jurisdicational challengers but became afﬁliated through the cofunding of prominent
national organizations. For example, Bradley, Parsons, Kauffman, and Druckenmiller each gave grants to Teach For America but otherwise funded their own
isolated (at least from the sample) set of jurisdictional challengers. Kauffman,
Keck, and Hayden are similar in their afﬁliation in giving to KIPP. On the other
hand, foundations such as Deutsche Bank, Noyce, and Ford Motor Company
Fund are completely disconnected from any organizational afﬁliations. The
graph of traditional institutions in ﬁgure 5 is quite different. Here we can see
that nearly every foundation funds its own network of public schools and districts, with the exceptions of Benedum and Grable, which share the Allegheny
Intermediate Unit in common, and Deutsche Bank and Altman, which cofunded Teachers College Columbia University.
NOVEMBER 2016
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FIG. 3.—Directed afﬁliation graph of funding patterns to jurisdictional challengers and traditional institutions. A thicker line represents a higher frequency of grant awards.
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FIG. 4.—Directed afﬁliation graph of organizational funding patterns to jurisdictional
challengers. Only foundations and cofunded organizations are labeled.

To this point we have seen some evidence that these nonmajor foundations are
following the gravity of major foundations in the K–12 philanthropic ﬁeld. They
have a clear preference for funding national advocacy and jurisdictional challengers over local advocacy and traditional educational institutions. However,
our sample of foundations did not act as a cohesive group in any of the contexts
explored thus far. Rather, clear factions emerged in both of the organizational
sectors we examined. In addition, as illustrated in table 2, many of the nonproﬁt
organizational grantees in our sample could not be categorized as either traditional institutions (e.g., public schools) or jurisdictional challengers (e.g., charter
schools). In fact, organizations offering college readiness services were awarded
more of the total funding (17.6%) than any other type of organization in the
sample. In addition, organizations offering arts education (8.8%), afterschool and
tutoring programs (8.2%), and other forms of student enrichment (7.2%) received more funding than any of the traditional institutions and jurisdictional
NOVEMBER 2016
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FIG. 5.—Directed afﬁliation graph of organizational funding patterns to traditional institutions. Only foundations and cofunded organizations are labeled.
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challengers. Although these organizations are not directly challenging traditional governance structures in education, it is clear that they played a crucial
role in the K–12 education objectives of these nonmajor foundations.

Assessing Network Convergence
Between 2000 and 2010 the giving patterns of incumbent foundations in the
realm of education policy converged dramatically (Reckhow and Snyder 2014).
Recall that convergent grants are those dollars given to organizations from two
or more foundations. Overall, 24% of the funds awarded from our sample
foundations were convergent grants. This is nowhere near the 64% found by
Reckhow and Snyder (2014) in 2010. Instead, it is much closer to the percentages they found among the top 15 in 2000 (23%) and 2005 (35%). Nevertheless, the top 5 convergent organizations in our sample—Harlem Children’s
Zone, College Summit, Teach For America, the BELL Foundation, and Hunts
Point Alliance for Children—do reﬂect the preference for jurisdictional challengers and college readiness found among the top 15. In other words, some of
the challenger foundations in our sample behaved like incumbents, but many
did not.
Figure 6 illustrates the full duality of convergent giving and receiving among
our sample of foundations and their recipient organizations. At ﬁrst glance, the
interpretation of this graph may seem overwhelming. However, a closer inspection reveals a structure with clearly differentiated clusters. Benedum and
Grable, for instance, form a distinct pair that converged on a variety of organizations in arts education and advocacy. Keck and Parsons formed a similar
pair that converged on organizations offering arts, advocacy, mentoring, and
other enrichment services. Moving clockwise, we next see that Kauffman and
Bradley made another unique pairing. As we anticipated, these two foundations
converged primarily on conservative think tanks and research organizations.
Finally, Altman and Hayden make up a fourth distinguishable pair that cofunded a mix of organizations that span the spectrum of organizational types.
The Barr Foundation also shares a strong afﬁliation with Hayden through the
cofunding of jurisdictional challengers and other student enrichment services.
Beyond the distinct pairs of foundations and their networks of organizations,
a variety of organizations occupy central positions in the graph. Their central positioning indicates that these organizations received multiple grants from
many of the same foundations. These are the organizations that met a higher
threshold of convergence, often receiving grants from three or four foundations in the sample. As anticipated, these organizations include many prominent jurisdictional challengers such as KIPP and TFA, but they also include
long-standing community organizations such as Big Brothers Big Sisters and the
NOVEMBER 2016
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FIG. 6.—Directed afﬁliation graph of organizational convergence of grant awards
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Boys and Girls Club. In addition, a number of newer organizations, such as the
Posse Foundation, BELL Foundation, and City Year, support K–12 students
and prepare them to enter college.

The Spatial Context of Nonmajor Foundation Funding
In this ﬁnal results section we situate our sampled foundations’ gifts in a geographic context to gain a deeper understanding of overall patterns of giving and
convergence. In total, 72.4% of funds were awarded to in-state organizations,
and the remaining 27.6% were awarded out of state. The choropleth map in
ﬁgure 7 represents the geographic distribution of the total funds given by our
sampled foundations. Organizations in the darkest shaded states received the
greatest amount of funding. Not surprisingly, the darkest shaded states (those
receiving more than $10 million)—California, Michigan, Missouri, New York,
and Massachusetts—are those where 12 of the 15 foundations in our sample are
headquartered. Although a number of funded organizations are located in
states without a sample foundation’s headquarters (e.g., Colorado, Iowa, and
Virginia), there is a signiﬁcant gap in grant funding between organizations in
the darkest shaded states and those in the Mountain West states and many states
in the South. This is not simply a feature of our sample, either. Of the 230 foundations from which we drew our sample, only 13 (5.7%) foundations are located in the 16 states (including Hawaii and Alaska, not shown) that received
no funding from our sample.
The ﬂow map in ﬁgure 8 allows us to examine the geographic dimension to
the network convergence observed in ﬁgure 6. The thickness of lines running
from the foundations’ cities to the recipient organizations’ cities corresponds to
the number of recipient organizations in the latter city. The reﬂexive arcs represent awards given to organizations located in the same city as the granting
foundation. To reduce clutter in the map, we did not differentiate the lines for
different foundations located in the same cities. To capture the geographic differences of foundations in the same city, we point to the proportion of within- and
between-city convergence for selected foundations.
A number of geographic patterns of convergence emerge from ﬁgure 8.
Most notably, the vast majority (76.5%) of convergent funds were directed to
organizations in New England, with most of this activity occurring in New York
(66.6%). For instance, the close network proximity between Barr, Hayden, and
Altman in ﬁgure 6 also corresponds to a distinct geographic proximity (of New
York City and Boston) of convergence in ﬁgure 8. Similarly, the convergent
funding of Benedum and Grable is almost entirely localized in Pittsburgh, where
both of these foundations are headquarted.
NOVEMBER 2016
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FIG. 7.—Choropleth map illustrating geographic distribution of awards across sample foundations
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FIG. 8.—Flow map of organizational convergence in grant awards
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Not all of the New England foundations adhered to a local pattern of convergence, however. Nearly half of Open Society’s (43%) and Deutsche Bank’s
(45%) convergence was directed to organizations outside of New York City. On
the other hand, not all of the tendency toward local convergence was conﬁned to
the East Coast. On the West Coast, more than 8 in 10 (82%) of Parsons’s and
Keck’s organizational convergence was within the greater Los Angeles area. Similar to Benedum and Grable in Pittsburgh, these LA-based foundations primarily converged on local organizations offering arts and enrichment services.
The Midwest-based foundations—who occupy close positions in ﬁgure 6—
follow an interstate pattern of convergence. Kauffman and Bradley best represent this pattern, with 100% of their convergent giving directed to out-of-state
organizations. Their cofunding of national advocacy and research organizations
explains the thick arcs running to Washington, DC, but they also converged with
other foundations on a number of national jurisdictional challengers (e.g., TFA,
KIPP). Ford Motor Company Fund and Dow also directed a majority of their convergent giving to organizations at nonlocal scales, albeit at substantially smaller
frequencies than Kauffman and Bradley.
The vast majority of convergent funding thus appears to have been driven by
the likelihood of having another foundation in close proximity. Bradley and
Kauffman, for example, simply do not have a counterpart in Wisconsin or Missouri (respectively) with which to converge. This is true of our sample and of the
broader ﬁeld of foundations engaged in education funding. Of the original 230
foundations from which we selected our sample, only 3 foundations are in Wisconsin, and only 2 are in Missouri. In contrast, New York (37), California (33),
and Pennsylvania (13) have substantially more foundations involved in these
efforts. Yet, geography does not tell the whole story. The results above clearly
demonstrate that Bradley’s and Kauffman’s national convergence is also driven
by an ideological alignment and commitment to building a network of national
advocacy organizations that promote market-based reform.

Discussion and Conclusion
Our task has been to determine whether nonmajor foundations (i.e., challengers)
tend to mimic the organizational giving patterns of elite foundations (i.e., major foundations, or incumbents) that focus their efforts in similar policy niches or
whether they pursue alternative organizational strategies toward these ends. In
short, we set out to test the new institutionalism model against an alternative
ﬁeld theoretical model. In particular, we hypothesized that our sample of nonmajor foundations would exhibit patterns of giving that diverged from their incumbent counterparts, but that they would do so heterogeneously. Whereas in
some instances it is clear that our sample of challenger foundations did follow
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major foundations (i.e., exhibit isomorphism), there is compelling evidence that
most of the foundations pursued divergent and highly varied organizational strategies. In other words, a ﬁeld theoretical model appears to be a better ﬁt for the
data. In the following, we situate our ﬁndings in the literature and discuss implications for education policy.
In the aggregate, our sample of nonmajor foundations did adhere to the incumbent preference of funding national over local advocacy organizations and
jurisdictional challengers over traditional institutions. In addition, we observed
a meaningful degree of organizational convergence for many of these advocacy
groups (e.g., Aspen Institute) and jurisdictional challengers (e.g., TFA). In many
other ways, however, the foundations in our sample gave against the grain of
their elite counterparts. Most important, in 2010 these challenger foundations
engaged in convergent giving much less frequently than those foundations in the
top 15 (see Reckhow and Snyder 2014). This ﬁnding is consistent with previous
research that found large foundations to be more likely than small foundations
(in terms of asset size) to engage in collaborative activities such as cofunding arrangements (Ostrower 2004). Others have argued that foundations with national
ambitions are more likely to engage in strategic (or venture philanthropic) forms
of giving to directly shift the direction of education policy (Colvin 2005). In general, our ﬁndings are consistent with the latter claim.
Our sample of challenger foundations diverged in other important ways. For
example, even though these foundations gave substantially more to charter
schools and networks than to public schools and districts, they still gave only
about a third as much to charters as did the top 15 foundations analyzed by
Reckhow and Snyder (2014), proportionately speaking. Instead, it was college
readiness organizations that were awarded on par (again, in proportion) with
what the top 15 incumbent foundations gave to jurisdictional challengers. In
addition, organizations that promote local arts and after-school programs were
funded at greater amounts overall than were any single category of jurisdictional
challenger. As previous research suggests, these foundations may be working to
position themselves within speciﬁc educational niches where they expect to have
the greatest impacts (Ferris et al. 2008). Regardless, future research should examine these college readiness and student enrichment organizations in more detail, and whether foundations have been changing their support for such organizations over time.
We can conclude that there are key similarities and differences in the organizational strategies between our sample of challenger foundations and their
incumbent counterparts, but it is more accurate to say that some challenger
foundations behave similarly to incumbents and that others act very differently.
As anticipated by our ﬁeld theoretical model, even when challenger foundations mimicked some of the organizational funding patterns of incumbents, they
simultaneously funded organizations that represented strategies of reform difNOVEMBER 2016
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ferent from theirs. That is, a clear pattern throughout the afﬁliation network
analysis is that the aggregate results hide meaningful variation. The approach
taken by Reckhow and Snyder (2014) does not allow us compare the subgroup
structure and our afﬁliation networks among those foundations in the top 15. It
is plausible, then, that the propensities of major foundations observed in the
aggregate conceal meaningful variations. Future research should explore these
potential variations in more detail and examine the extent to which factions of
major and nonmajor foundations shift over time and place.
We also identiﬁed a geographic speciﬁcity in these factions through the GIS
analysis. Some factions appeared to mimic one another within geographic
proximity (e.g., Benedum and Grable), whereas others showed similarity across
multiple state boundaries (e.g., Bradley and Kauffman). Thus, in many cases,
geographic proximity appears to structure (or at least correspond to) similarities
and differences in giving patterns, whereas social or ideological proximity appears to be the underlying process at work in other cases. These theoretical
processes deserve greater attention in future research.

Implications
Several practical implications follow from our analysis of nonmajor philanthropic giving in K–12 education. Our results suggest that there is (or at least
was, in 2010) considerable space in the philanthropic ﬁeld for those organizations looking to pursue policy objectives running counter to the market-driven
policies that are the current dominant approach to education reform. Indeed,
the foundations examined above demonstrate an extraordinary range of organizational variation in their patterns of giving. The importance of fostering
diverse educational experiences across the arts, sciences, and humanities was
evident among some factions of foundations, as was support for racial, religious,
and other group-based equity. Many of these foundations also provided vital
funds to a variety of support services and academic enrichment programs that
would otherwise be absent in the current education policy climate in the United
States. Thus, attempts to homogenize the work of foundations—at least at the
time of this analysis—are highly problematic.
On the other hand, because the policy networks are constructed and sustained through philanthropic giving, they are also vulnerable to change. It is
evident that policy networks are a preferred mode of governance for venture
philanthropists, who demand measurable results backed by the threat of cutting
off funds and moving on to the next venture. However, for those concerned
about the lack of accountability for policy networks and their philanthropic
ﬁnanciers, the ephemeral order of these networks poses a meaningful challenge
to democratic approaches to educational governance. Many of the organi164
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zations we have discussed are largely dependent on foundation dollars to sustain their operating budgets. There is a great risk, then, of these services being
cut if foundations decide to shift policy focus. This is true of jurisdictional challengers and many other nonproﬁt organizations whose operating budgets are
not ﬁnanced by tax revenue. Future studies should examine how shifting
patterns of philanthropic giving impact the services of these ﬁnancially dependent organizations.
From our geographic analysis, we also saw that money tended to ﬂow and
converge locally among our sampled foundations—and this occurred in a relatively limited number of cities and states. This can be welcome news for organizations positioned in New York or California, but it also means that cities
and states without a substantial base of foundations will be unable to sustain
organizations that rely heavily on foundation dollars. Rural states in the Mountain West and South, in particular, are at a major disadvantage in this regard.
These states may not serve as many students as the urban Midwestern and
coastal areas, but they nevertheless represent a meaningful portion of the US
population and face a litany of educational challenges that directly impact rural
and urban communities (Carr and Kefalas 2009; Tieken 2014). One might
argue that major foundations are better equipped at ﬁlling this role, but at present we have no research to support this assertion. More extensive GIS work is
needed to gain a deeper understanding of these geographic disparities in foundation awards to education.
The results of our analysis also add to the ongoing conversation concerning
the role of private wealth in shaping public policy. It is no secret that private
foundations allow wealthy individuals and corporations to shield substantial
portions of their wealth from tax liability (Saltman 2010). This provides foundations with exclusive power to shape the direction of public education while
simultaneously diminishing public control over these lost tax revenues. That is,
the growing inﬂuence of philanthropic foundations—whether major on not—
comes at the expense of public inﬂuence. We have no illusions about the effectiveness of our current democratic system of governance in shaping education,
but in principle there are at least some institutional levers (e.g., judicial, electoral)
that members of the public sphere can push to mobilize educational change. At
present there is simply no such mechanism to challenge the public education
policy ambitions of private foundations.
We do not mean to imply that philanthropic involvement in education policy
is inherently problematic or antithetical to a thriving public education system.
Many of the foundations in our sample exhibited a strong commitment to supporting traditional public schools and community organizations that offer rich
curricula to some of the most disadvantaged students in the United States. Yet,
much like their elite counterparts, others focused their funding efforts on private
organizations working to fundamentally alter the very idea of public education.
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Regardless of one’s support for or opposition to this particular policy agenda,
the key point here is that foundations and the organizations that seek their funding determine these matters privately. Therefore, although our results demonstrate that nonmajor foundations represent a wide range of visions for public
education, many of these visions take form with very limited contributions from
those most inﬂuenced by their gifts.

Notes
We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their detailed feedback and
insightful suggestions.
1. We use the lexicon of Fligstein and McAdam (2012) because their work is the most
complete and thorough treatment of organizational ﬁeld theory.
2. The data supporting this assertion came from Benedum’s 2010 Form 990 downloaded from the Foundation Center’s 990 Finder, http://foundationcenter.org/ﬁndfunders
/990ﬁnder/.
3. The 2010 Top 50 Foundation Funding lists were the most recent publicly available
lists from the Foundation Center, http://foundationcenter.org/educationexcellence
/top_lists.html, as of access on June 15, 2014.
4. http://foundationcenter.org/ﬁndfunders/990ﬁnder/, accessed on June 15, 2014.
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